EDITORIAL : THE BENGAL FIRE BY Klaus Natorp
THE DAILY FRANKFURTER ALLUREMENT ZEITUNG
(West Germany) September 23, 1971
The tragedy in Bengal continues without an end in sight. Is this really unalterable ? The matter has long taken on a * form which makes it impossible to describe the conflict as the “internal affair” of Pakistan. The indescribable suffering, which millions of people in Bengal are undergoing, gives the indirectly concerned parties the right to speak out. But still, what could they do ?
Humanitarian aid is most important and urgent. The care of the East Pakistani refugees in India and the equally numerous afflicted and needy in eastern Bengal could still be greatly improved. But the matter should not rest there. Not only the symptoms of the crisis are to be treated, but also the root of the sickness should be cured. Two requirements are necessary for that: the internal peace in Pakistan, that means, reconciliation of the estranged wings of the state jointly formed in 1947, and the abatement of the dangerous tension, which developed during the course of the East Bengali conflict between the subcontinental neighbors, Pakistan and India. As far as the latter is concerned, lately there have been some signs of relaxation. The danger of war seems to have lessened. Of course, the sounds of fighting can still be heard on both sides, but it seems that in the meantime all responsible persons in New Delhi and Islamabad are convinced that a military confrontation would be a greater disaster for both countries than the present situation, which resulted from the violent suppression of the Bengali liberation movement.
The Soviet treaty, signed on August 9, also seem to have played a role in decreasing the danger of war. The Soviet Union would like to prevent any chaotic clashes in the immediate vicinity of her southern border, especially any kind that the Chinese could possibly benefit from. And even if at first, it seemed that Moscow bias preferred to side with India and the movement for an independent Bangladesh, which is so vehemently supported in India, it however, became soon evident, that the Soviet leaders are really trying to consequently follow equal treatment of India and Pakistan, which was initiated in 1966 in Tashkent. Moreover, just recently she announced her interest in the preservation of a stable Pakistan and even documented this position through the continuation of her development aid. This probably had a sobering effect on India. Naturally, the Indo Soviet treaty also had a cooling effect on Pakistan. The Government in Islamabad would have to reckon with constant international involvement, if it meddles with India.
However, the danger of an armed conflict between the sub-continental states has not passed, because the origin of the tension still exists. The partisans of the East Bengal liberation movement, who mainly operate from India, are a constant vexation for Pakistan. During counter fights, border viola¬tions can easily occur, which could then result in even greater fighting. With the end of the monsoon the civil war parties will have a greater chance for advance. An increase in clashes can be expected.
Therefore, a neutral mediator is urgently needed, who could bring India and Pakistan to the negotiation table, before new critical incidents arise. On such an occasion the subject would also have to be discussed how the East Pakistani refugees could be hastened to return to their homes. Their permanent maintenance is an unbearable burden for India. Naturally, the subject of the internal situation of Pakistan would come up, thereby making it all the more difficult. Be¬cause the refugees would only return if they could be sure that they would be safe there and the West Pakistani troops would be in their barracks.
But Pakistan would not be willing to discuss the internal situation in Bengal, even with an unbiased agent. Namely, because then the Government in Islamabad would have to admit, that the reconciliation of the western wing with the eastern wing—the already mentioned number one requirement —still lies far off, if it is at all possible. The majority of the population still consider the West Pakistani soldiers as an occupation army and looks upon the civilian administration, which was appointed by them, as traitors. They offer passive and active resistance—even without Indian support. Their idol is and remains the imprisoned Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. If he and the other leaders of the Awami League are not also included in President Yahya Khan’s general amnesty, then the chances for an internal settlement are quite slight. Without a new start, it will be impossible to break through the vicious circle of military suppression, resistance, retaliation, sabotage, flight, hunger, disease and what other terrible things it may store. But so far too little has happen¬ed to encourage Pakistan to make a new start.
(West Germany) September 23, 1971
The tragedy in Bengal continues without an end in sight. Is this really unalterable ? The matter has long taken on a * form which makes it impossible to describe the conflict as the “internal affair” of Pakistan. The indescribable suffering, which millions of people in Bengal are undergoing, gives the indirectly concerned parties the right to speak out. But still, what could they do ?
Humanitarian aid is most important and urgent. The care of the East Pakistani refugees in India and the equally numerous afflicted and needy in eastern Bengal could still be greatly improved. But the matter should not rest there. Not only the symptoms of the crisis are to be treated, but also the root of the sickness should be cured. Two requirements are necessary for that: the internal peace in Pakistan, that means, reconciliation of the estranged wings of the state jointly formed in 1947, and the abatement of the dangerous tension, which developed during the course of the East Bengali conflict between the subcontinental neighbors, Pakistan and India. As far as the latter is concerned, lately there have been some signs of relaxation. The danger of war seems to have lessened. Of course, the sounds of fighting can still be heard on both sides, but it seems that in the meantime all responsible persons in New Delhi and Islamabad are convinced that a military confrontation would be a greater disaster for both countries than the present situation, which resulted from the violent suppression of the Bengali liberation movement.
The Soviet treaty, signed on August 9, also seem to have played a role in decreasing the danger of war. The Soviet Union would like to prevent any chaotic clashes in the immediate vicinity of her southern border, especially any kind that the Chinese could possibly benefit from. And even if at first, it seemed that Moscow bias preferred to side with India and the movement for an independent Bangladesh, which is so vehemently supported in India, it however, became soon evident, that the Soviet leaders are really trying to consequently follow equal treatment of India and Pakistan, which was initiated in 1966 in Tashkent. Moreover, just recently she announced her interest in the preservation of a stable Pakistan and even documented this position through the continuation of her development aid. This probably had a sobering effect on India. Naturally, the Indo Soviet treaty also had a cooling effect on Pakistan. The Government in Islamabad would have to reckon with constant international involvement, if it meddles with India.
However, the danger of an armed conflict between the sub-continental states has not passed, because the origin of the tension still exists. The partisans of the East Bengal liberation movement, who mainly operate from India, are a constant vexation for Pakistan. During counter fights, border viola¬tions can easily occur, which could then result in even greater fighting. With the end of the monsoon the civil war parties will have a greater chance for advance. An increase in clashes can be expected.
Therefore, a neutral mediator is urgently needed, who could bring India and Pakistan to the negotiation table, before new critical incidents arise. On such an occasion the subject would also have to be discussed how the East Pakistani refugees could be hastened to return to their homes. Their permanent maintenance is an unbearable burden for India. Naturally, the subject of the internal situation of Pakistan would come up, thereby making it all the more difficult. Be¬cause the refugees would only return if they could be sure that they would be safe there and the West Pakistani troops would be in their barracks.
But Pakistan would not be willing to discuss the internal situation in Bengal, even with an unbiased agent. Namely, because then the Government in Islamabad would have to admit, that the reconciliation of the western wing with the eastern wing—the already mentioned number one requirement —still lies far off, if it is at all possible. The majority of the population still consider the West Pakistani soldiers as an occupation army and looks upon the civilian administration, which was appointed by them, as traitors. They offer passive and active resistance—even without Indian support. Their idol is and remains the imprisoned Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. If he and the other leaders of the Awami League are not also included in President Yahya Khan’s general amnesty, then the chances for an internal settlement are quite slight. Without a new start, it will be impossible to break through the vicious circle of military suppression, resistance, retaliation, sabotage, flight, hunger, disease and what other terrible things it may store. But so far too little has happen¬ed to encourage Pakistan to make a new start.
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