U.S. NEWS AND WORLD PRESS THE 24th NOVEMBER, 1971
N.Y. Times M]alcolm M. Browne reports from, Karachi on a Pakistani charge Monday night that India had launched an all-out military offensive against her without declaration of war. A Pakistani radio report said there was heavy fighting all along East Pakistan’s borders with India and admitted that Indian forces had “made some dents in our territory,” Browne said.
Times’ Sydney H. Schanberg reports from Calcutta : “A major offensive by Bengali insurgents is apparently under way against the Pakistani army on the western side of East Pakistan, according to reports reaching Calcutta. Capture of the city of Jessore seems to be a key initial objective, and heavy fighting was reported not far from the city, which is about 20 miles inside East Pakistan and 85 miles southwest of. the regional capital, Dacca.

From news reports now available it would appear that the use of massive military flee-power has broken the Awami League and its supporters in most urban centers. But control of urban centers at gunpoint in a country where 90% of the population lives in rural areas hardly constitutes a framework for any effective government, let alone a popular one. The Immediate prospect is for ruthless military rule in urban centers, with tenuous control over a country-side which is likely to become increasingly the base for armed guerrilla resistance.

The history of economic and political domination of East Pakistan by the West led naturally to increasing demands for provincial autonomy spearheaded by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League. Its 6-point platform for autonomy sought to transfer control over foreign trade, foreign aid allocation and taxation, powers to the provinces so that no province could be dominated through disproportionate control of central government’s powers over resource allocation.

The basic facts seem to support the East Pakistan charge of economic domination by the West. The economic dispari­ties between East and West Pakistan have been so serious for so long that the Pakistan Government’s highest planning au­thority has been forced to take official note of them.

A recent report by a panel of experts to the Planning Commission of the Government of Pakistan provides authori­tative documentation of the widening of economic disparities, in the two regions. The most striking fact in this report is the widening gap between the income of the average West Pakistani and his Eastern counterpart. In 1959-60, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 32% higher than in the East. Over the next ten years annual rate of growth of in­come of West Pakistan was 6.2% while it was on 4.2% in East Pakistan. As a result, by 1969-70 the per capita income of the- West was 61% higher than in the East. Thus in ten years the- income gap doubled in percentage terms, it increased even- more in absolute terms.

East Pakistanis Blane three instruments of central govern­ment policy for their plight:

(a)           Pakistan’s scant indigestible resources, plus foreign aid, are directed unduly to the development of West Pakistan to the comparative neglect of East Pakistan.

(b)           In particular, East Pakistan’s foreign trade earnings are diverted to finance imports for West Pakistan.

(c)            Economic policy favors West Pakistan at the expense of the East. Specially, tariffs, import controls, and industrial licensing compel East Pakistan to purchase commodities from West Pakistan which, but for the controls, they could obtain more cheaply in world markets.

We believe the East Pakistani claims to be largely justified. First, it is indisputable that the bulk of public invest­ment has been in West Pakistan though the majority of the population lies in the East. With 60% of the population, East Pakistan’s share of central government development ex­penditure has been as low as 20% during 1950/51—1954/55 attaining a peak of 36% during the Third Five Year Plan period 1965/66—1969/70. East Pakistan has received an even smaller share of private investment, less than 25%.

It may be true, as defenders of Pakistan government policy claim, that the great bulk of worthwhile investment opportunities have been in the West, though the relative ■ attractiveness' of the West may be more the effect of overall government policy than a cause. In any event the fact remains that investments in the West have done little or nothing for the people in the East.

As for the second point, it is clear that foreign exchange has been allocated to the detriment of East Pakistan. Over the last two decades East Pakistan’s share of total Pakistan ■ export earnings has varied between 50% and 70% while its share of imports has been in the range of 25% to 30%. Until 1962—63 East Pakistan has shown significant surpluses on foreign 'account, which has changed in recent years to small ■ deficits. By contrast the West’s foreign trade has shown a substantial and chronic deficit that has absorbed virtually all foreign exchange made available through foreign aid.

With respect to the third point, general economic policy- has clearly favored West Pakistan. The West’s preponderant share of imports and investments might have provided inexpen­sive necessities for all of Pakistan’s people. In fact, it has allowed the development of inefficient industries, which, ironically, have prospered largely because of tariffs and quotas- that have made East Pakistan a captive market. 40% of all exports of West Pakistan are sold to East Pakistan; in 1968- 69 the West sold 50% more to the East than it bought from the East.

An analysis of foreign trade data reveals that a net trans­fer of resources has taken place from East to West Pakistan. According to the official report referred to above, East Pakistan has transferred approximately $2.6 billion to West Pakistan over the period 1948-49 to 1968-69.

In short, Pakistan’s economic policies are harmful to East Pakistan. “Exploitation” may be a strong word, but it seems clear, all in all, that East Pakistan’s economic interest has been subordinated to those of the West, and that the East Pakistanis have had good cause to resent that fact.

The economic domination of East Pakistan has been facilitated by West Pakistani dominance of the Central Govern­ment. The military regime of Pakistan has existed, with modifications, since 1958, and decision-making authority rests with a well-entrenched civil service and their military bosses. All senior military members of the administration have been West Pakistani in 1960, and the proportion has not changed much since. The Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commis­sion and the Central Finance Minister, key individuals in resource allocation, has always been West Pakistanis.

The location of the Central government in West Pakistan has encouraged the concentration of industry and the entre­preneurial class in West Pakistan. Such a concentration is to be expected in an economic system where direct allocation control of resources by the government makes direct access: to government authorities a prime business asset.

Since 1951 Pakistan has been a major recipient of U.S. economic aid amounting to approximately 3 billion by 1969. Except for food aid donated under Public Law 480, the bulk of this assistance has been used to support industrialization in West Pakistan, with only a handful of projects undertaken in East Pakistan.

The quantum of U.S. military aid to Pakistan is a classi­fied figure but two estimates put it between $ 1.5 to $ 2 billion for the period between 1954 and 1965. The assistance has included F-104 Star fighters, Patton tanks, armored personnel carriers, automatic and recoilless infantry weapons. This impressive array of modern weaponry was given expressly for defensive purposes. With Pakistan an early member of SEATO and CENTO this military aid was intended to bolster the armed containment of the Communist Block in the Dulles era of U.S. foreign policy but apart from the brief border war with India of 1965 the only active use of these sophisticated weapons has occurred against the unarmed and defenseless civilians of East Pakistan.

The growth and maintenance of the superstructure of the armed forces which was built up with massive U.S. military aid continued even after 1965 when the United States decided to put an embargo on the delivery of arms to both Pakistan and India. This was made possible by diverting resources from the much-needed development projects. East Pakistan,,

Poorer and loss powerful politically than the West, suffered? More by this irrational policy.

Surprisingly, the United States has just recently (October 1970) made an exception to its embargo on military sales to Pakistan. According to the information available, the United States has offered to supply Pakistan the following items:

(a)           Armored personnel carriers (approx. 300)

(b)           Maritime reconnaissance Aircraft (4)

(c)            F-104 Jet fighters (6)

(d)           B-57 bombers (7).

Fortunately, no sales or deliveries have yet been made. It: is not too late to rescind the offer, a move that would be of practical as well as symbolic value.

 U.S. Govt. Top Secret Report.


Editor’s Note: This report was prepared by Mr. Arthur K. Blood, Consul-General, American Consulate, Dacca with the help of three eminent scholars of Harvard University, U.S.A. They are Mr. Edward A. Mason, Mr. Robert Hoffman and Mr. Stephen A. Marglin. After having compiled the report, Mr. Blood sent it to the U.S. Senate for their necessary guidance.

Later on, it was learnt that Mr. Arthur K. Blood was call­ed back to Washington as a result of his not seeing the fact eye to eye with the U.S. Govt. When we heard of this inci­dent, we were mad to have possession of such secret report. A Bengali employee of the U.S. mission got this report smuggl­ed out of mission which we now place before our readers.