PAKISTAN: STAR IN THE WEST
FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW September 25, 1971
Karachi : In the past Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto has flourished on dilemmas. This .time it is different. The brittle, unpredictable, intensely power-conscious politician from Sind now faces a situation where he will either go all the way to the top or be thrown all the way out.
The Awami League’s emergence after the December election as a solid party commanding absolute majority in the national assembly had upset Bhutto as much as it had upset army hawks in Islamabad. It has since become common role in liquidating the effects of that election in East Pakistan and handing the province over to the predatory troops.
When President Yahya Khan announced a general amnesty earlier this month. Bhutto was again deeply disturbed. His worry was whether Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would be among those released, for only if the Sheikh continued to remain outside the political picture would he, Bhutto, be the undisputed leader of the national assembly to be called upon to form a government as and when power is transferred to civilian hands.
Bhutto has left little doubt about his impatience. While other political party leaders are against any transfer of power by the military until such time as it is possible in both wings of the country simultaneously, Bhutto wants it now. And he wants it to be “full, complete and total”. If the military is not willing to do so, he has threatened to launch a mass movement in the western wing for the vindication of people’s rights, as he puts it.
Bhutto’s hurry may at least in part be due to his realization that his People’s Party is facing a threat of disintegration. Wealthy landlords vie with peasants’ and workers’ leaders for leverage in its top echelons. Differences came sharply into focus early this year when Bhutto suspended from party membership Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Qasuri, a young lawyer who was a student hero and who had been elected to the national assembly as a People’s Party candidate from near Lahore. Another recent defector was Mukhtar Rana, a prominent labor leader from Lyallpur.
There is considerable coffee-house discussion here over whether the military government will yield to the pressure tactics of Bhutto. Perhaps a way out will come automatically following the government’s decision to adopt a constitution drawn up by “experts” and hold by-election in East Pakistan.
If Bhutto still insists on agitation, an ugly situation could result.. Even popular backing for a movement led by him cannot be taken for granted. True, there is widespread desire for parliamentary democracy and an end to martial law, but, after all, the People’s Party polled only 35% of the votes in December ; more than' 60% going to rightist parties.
Bengali Plans By T. J. S. George
Hong Kong: The skies over Bengal will be dry again by next month. Tanks can move again, aircraft can fly and troops get around. Just before the onset of the monsoon, the military authorities had struck hard and rapidly to secure the border towns which had been under rebel control. When the rainy season ends, they are likely to fan out with equal speed in mopping up operations.
This possibility lends an enigmatic, aura to the claim being made by “official” representatives of Bangladesh travelling Awami League members of parliament or defected diplomats —that their struggle will be carried to a successful military conclusion by the year’s end. The only safety clause they admit is that either Bangladesh will be free in the next two or three months or the struggle there will turn into a long guerrilla war of attrition.
This is not entirely wishful thinking. Five thousand extremely well trained guerrillas have entered the battle during the past month or so supplementing though with out¬dated arms, the 10,000 members of the former Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles still active inside the country.
The Bangladesh “government” (location unknown) also is pushing through an intensive programmer of military training for what may eventually turn out to be a “regular army” of 60,000 to 70,000 men. These personnel come almost exclusively from the ranks of the refugees, now officially estimated by the Indian side at 8.5 million, and by the Pakistan at around two million.
The freedom fighters will be only as effective as their weapons. But on this score the Bangladesh leaders are full of confidence. Arms, they say, are no problem. They cite the substantial funds collected by overseas Bengalis, the availability of modern weapons on the commercial market and the willingness of some countries like Israel to help them. They do not mention it, but the “reliable rear area” of India must also be a major factor in these calculations.
Logical as most of these calculations are, it is difficult to imagine the West Pakistani military ordering an about turn in East Pakistan. Latest moves suggest a plan to impose a civilian administration under whose cover the military can continue to rule. The recently appointed civilian governor has picked a 10-man caretaker cabinet and by-election have been scheduled in the eastern wing for the last week of November. By then the government-drafted constitution will be ready.
These moves will only make the Bengali more bitter; they don’t recognize Governor A. M. Malik as one of them, the cabinet consists of hated members of rightist parties trounced in the election, the by-elections are for seats arbitrarily denied to elected members of the Awami League.
What could help the freedom fighters still more, however, is unrest in West Pakistan. The Bengali struggle may slowly be having an effect on tribal movement for autonomy in the western wing. The Khaiber Mail recently reported the activities of the Baluchistan national front for liberation, Kabul (Afghanistan) Radio recently broadcast a report about mammoth meetings by Pathans demanding a sovereign Pakthoonistan.
Perhaps more significant politically is the growing unrest among workers and students in the urban areas. For the moment they seem to be looking to the effervescent Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to lead them to the Promised Land.
Bhutto is maneuvering. He is still believed to be on friendly personal terms with his cocktail companion, President Yahya Khan, and was recently credited with the suggestion that Yahya become the “national Prime Minister”. On the other hand, he is cementing his relations with the younger middle-ranking officers who are known to be disenchanted with the old men at the top.
It would not be beyond imagination for Bhutto to consider the possibility of a coup detach using the younger officers for the principal thrust and perhaps Yahya as a temporary unifying symbol.
If -Bhutto gets into the driver’s seat, he can be expected to go to any length to hold on to East Pakistan. But others could intervene—a decision by the younger officers not to continue military repression in the east, a well-timed military move by India and a decisive strike by the Bengali forces them at the right moment.
The very fact that talk of all kinds of possibilities has started in West Pakistan is significant. There have even been public demands by some leaders for an end to the excesses in the eastern wing. By any reckoning, October-November could be a decisive period for Pakistan.
Fighters of Darkness
By Matt Franjola from Calcutta
The guerrilla bands of the Mukti Fouj (freedom fighters) have become the armies of the night in East Pakistan. The army is in control of the 78 major towns and most of the larger villages, but—especially in the province of Tippera and Noakhali southeast of Dacca—the guerrillas are getting stronger. Hit-and-run tactics and sabotage threaten the West Pakistani army’s communications; in this way, the people of “Bangla Desh” hope to erode the western wing’s dominion over them. The Mukti Fouj effectively control the narrow corridor between Noakhali and the port of Chittagong ; and bands in Sylhet, Rangpur and Chittagong less strong, have harassed the army there.
Most guerrilla bases are inside East Pakistan, a few groups operate from the Indian side of the border. The bases reflect their determination. “A” camp is a base for former East Pakistan Rifles militiamen, surrounded by lush green jute fields and hidden in a grove in East Pakistan. A young guard snaps to attention at the bamboo gate.
A small Bangla Desh flag hangs from the eaves of one of two long thatched huts in the camp. Inside the huts, about 250 men in sarongs sleep on woven mats laid over the hard packed earth- Near each man lies his weapon, uniform and assorted personal gear. Each hut is 80 feet long by 20 feet wide and sleeps about 60 men.
The camp motor pool also has a sentry, guarding two jeeps, one truck and two farm tractors, all of which have been taken from East Pakistan civil or military forces. Several large tents in the centre of the camp constitute the headquarters area and the officers’ quarters, equipped with old tables and chairs. There is a dispensary, looked after
by the camp’s doctor, Abdul Mannan. “It was only after the events of March 25 that these men revolted,” Dr. Mannan explained. “Only after the Pakistani army attacked the Bengali police and the East Pakistan Rifles headquarters in Dacca and killed large numbers of people did they kill their West Pakistani officers and begin their resistance”.
The camp is clean, and there is good discipline. At six in the morning the men line up and those on patrol that day are briefed—standing to attention as a sergeant reads the names and mission assigned to each man- A pep talk follows, in which the men are exhorted to remember they are fighting for independence and must make great sacrifice.
Patrol leave the camp twice a day, at daybreak and dusk. Most forays last 12 hours, but intermittently there are forays deep into territory controlled by the Pakistan army, and these take four or five days. Each rebel unit consists of about 20 men, but it may be split into smaller groups in the field for some missions. One group will be assigned to watch for Pakistan army patrols which could threaten the camp. The main patrols seek out small army forces or single vehicles on the roads. They may plant mines, but their main tactic is the ambush.
Two former Pakistani artillerymen who have defected Kamuj Jaman, 24, a veteran of the Indo-Pakistan war was in Kashmir, and Sadar Ali, 22, who had three years’ army experience, estimate the men in their camp “have killed more than 200 Pakistanis in the last three months”. This figure is probably inflated since most of the fighting takes place at night when it would be difficult to count the number of dead. A close estimate would be about 50 killed—probably fewer. In Vietnam it is assumed that two men are wounded for every man killed. And it is unlikely these fighters, poorly equipped, could have put a 600-man battalion out of commission.
“We get most of our new arms and ammunition from Pakistan army dead and wounded,” Kamuj Jaman said. “The Mukti Fouj area headquarters periodically sends us supplies too”. There is not a lot of ammunition in the camp, and two men with quartermaster experience keep strict account of all supplies. The ammunition given to each patrol are carefully noted and have to be turned in on completion of the mission, Dr. Mannan commented, “there is not enough ammunition to mount any large attacks, but for guerrilla tactics it is sufficient. The patrols are lightly armed with British sub machine guns, old Enfield rifles and some light machine-guns. Occasionally a group has two-inch mortars, and there are also some anti-tank bazookas that are used against bunkers.
Some men in handcuffs, alleged to be spies for the Pakistan army, were in the camp. Dr. Mannan said local villagers, had reported seeing them leading an army patrol through a guerrilla minefield. The men had confessed to being members of the Moslem League and the Jamat i-Islam Party but denied they were involved in any of the killing and looting done by League people. They insisted they were farmers and had been forced by the army to show them through the mines- According to Mannan : “the men will probably not be shot but will be given a chance to prove their loyalty in battle with the Mukti Fouj. “The captives said they had not been tortured, and they were being fed the same potatoes, curry and rice as the rebels.
During the night one patrol led by Kamuj Jaman made contact with some Pakistani army troops in two bunkers in a small village about half a mile from the camp. The sporadic staccato bursts of machine gun fire could he heard for about an hour. When the patrol returned the following morning, Jaman reported “the villagers told us the Pakistanis were in some bunkers nearby. We tried to sneak up on them, but they heard something and started firing. They knew they had given away their position, so they withdrew. We fired at their noise but don’t know if we hit anyone”.
At present the Mukti Fouj policy is to keep up pressure on the smaller outlying army posts- As the guerrillas become stronger, they will move from the jungles into the small villages and towns and, eventually, into the cities. They count on Islamabad’s financial difficulties and the over¬extended supply lines to bring closer the victory in which they the 75 million people of East Pakistan can endure longer than the 100,000 West Pakistan troops stationed on their soil.
But if recent estimates are correct, 25 million of their compatriots are facing starvation. A major famine is believed by two US doctors to be around the corner—a famine which, because Islamabad refuses to acknowledge the severity of the situation, little has been done to prevent. Soon, they say, it will be too late to avert the crisis. Hoarding of food stock is already commonplace, prices have rocketed—and the army has taken many of the emergency stores.
People asked as Biafra surrendered whether the Nigerian government genuinely wished to make strenuous efforts to save the stubborn Ibos from famine. And the outside world may wonder how blind Islamabad really is. If these people -die, the Mukti Fouj loses a third of its allies. But any such calculation by Islamabad would ignore the probability that every funeral pyre will ignite the hatred of more Bengali. The Bangladesh leaders have said “the time is past for any political solution blood is a river that can never be bridged”.
Karachi : In the past Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto has flourished on dilemmas. This .time it is different. The brittle, unpredictable, intensely power-conscious politician from Sind now faces a situation where he will either go all the way to the top or be thrown all the way out.
The Awami League’s emergence after the December election as a solid party commanding absolute majority in the national assembly had upset Bhutto as much as it had upset army hawks in Islamabad. It has since become common role in liquidating the effects of that election in East Pakistan and handing the province over to the predatory troops.
When President Yahya Khan announced a general amnesty earlier this month. Bhutto was again deeply disturbed. His worry was whether Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would be among those released, for only if the Sheikh continued to remain outside the political picture would he, Bhutto, be the undisputed leader of the national assembly to be called upon to form a government as and when power is transferred to civilian hands.
Bhutto has left little doubt about his impatience. While other political party leaders are against any transfer of power by the military until such time as it is possible in both wings of the country simultaneously, Bhutto wants it now. And he wants it to be “full, complete and total”. If the military is not willing to do so, he has threatened to launch a mass movement in the western wing for the vindication of people’s rights, as he puts it.
Bhutto’s hurry may at least in part be due to his realization that his People’s Party is facing a threat of disintegration. Wealthy landlords vie with peasants’ and workers’ leaders for leverage in its top echelons. Differences came sharply into focus early this year when Bhutto suspended from party membership Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Qasuri, a young lawyer who was a student hero and who had been elected to the national assembly as a People’s Party candidate from near Lahore. Another recent defector was Mukhtar Rana, a prominent labor leader from Lyallpur.
There is considerable coffee-house discussion here over whether the military government will yield to the pressure tactics of Bhutto. Perhaps a way out will come automatically following the government’s decision to adopt a constitution drawn up by “experts” and hold by-election in East Pakistan.
If Bhutto still insists on agitation, an ugly situation could result.. Even popular backing for a movement led by him cannot be taken for granted. True, there is widespread desire for parliamentary democracy and an end to martial law, but, after all, the People’s Party polled only 35% of the votes in December ; more than' 60% going to rightist parties.
Bengali Plans By T. J. S. George
Hong Kong: The skies over Bengal will be dry again by next month. Tanks can move again, aircraft can fly and troops get around. Just before the onset of the monsoon, the military authorities had struck hard and rapidly to secure the border towns which had been under rebel control. When the rainy season ends, they are likely to fan out with equal speed in mopping up operations.
This possibility lends an enigmatic, aura to the claim being made by “official” representatives of Bangladesh travelling Awami League members of parliament or defected diplomats —that their struggle will be carried to a successful military conclusion by the year’s end. The only safety clause they admit is that either Bangladesh will be free in the next two or three months or the struggle there will turn into a long guerrilla war of attrition.
This is not entirely wishful thinking. Five thousand extremely well trained guerrillas have entered the battle during the past month or so supplementing though with out¬dated arms, the 10,000 members of the former Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles still active inside the country.
The Bangladesh “government” (location unknown) also is pushing through an intensive programmer of military training for what may eventually turn out to be a “regular army” of 60,000 to 70,000 men. These personnel come almost exclusively from the ranks of the refugees, now officially estimated by the Indian side at 8.5 million, and by the Pakistan at around two million.
The freedom fighters will be only as effective as their weapons. But on this score the Bangladesh leaders are full of confidence. Arms, they say, are no problem. They cite the substantial funds collected by overseas Bengalis, the availability of modern weapons on the commercial market and the willingness of some countries like Israel to help them. They do not mention it, but the “reliable rear area” of India must also be a major factor in these calculations.
Logical as most of these calculations are, it is difficult to imagine the West Pakistani military ordering an about turn in East Pakistan. Latest moves suggest a plan to impose a civilian administration under whose cover the military can continue to rule. The recently appointed civilian governor has picked a 10-man caretaker cabinet and by-election have been scheduled in the eastern wing for the last week of November. By then the government-drafted constitution will be ready.
These moves will only make the Bengali more bitter; they don’t recognize Governor A. M. Malik as one of them, the cabinet consists of hated members of rightist parties trounced in the election, the by-elections are for seats arbitrarily denied to elected members of the Awami League.
What could help the freedom fighters still more, however, is unrest in West Pakistan. The Bengali struggle may slowly be having an effect on tribal movement for autonomy in the western wing. The Khaiber Mail recently reported the activities of the Baluchistan national front for liberation, Kabul (Afghanistan) Radio recently broadcast a report about mammoth meetings by Pathans demanding a sovereign Pakthoonistan.
Perhaps more significant politically is the growing unrest among workers and students in the urban areas. For the moment they seem to be looking to the effervescent Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to lead them to the Promised Land.
Bhutto is maneuvering. He is still believed to be on friendly personal terms with his cocktail companion, President Yahya Khan, and was recently credited with the suggestion that Yahya become the “national Prime Minister”. On the other hand, he is cementing his relations with the younger middle-ranking officers who are known to be disenchanted with the old men at the top.
It would not be beyond imagination for Bhutto to consider the possibility of a coup detach using the younger officers for the principal thrust and perhaps Yahya as a temporary unifying symbol.
If -Bhutto gets into the driver’s seat, he can be expected to go to any length to hold on to East Pakistan. But others could intervene—a decision by the younger officers not to continue military repression in the east, a well-timed military move by India and a decisive strike by the Bengali forces them at the right moment.
The very fact that talk of all kinds of possibilities has started in West Pakistan is significant. There have even been public demands by some leaders for an end to the excesses in the eastern wing. By any reckoning, October-November could be a decisive period for Pakistan.
Fighters of Darkness
By Matt Franjola from Calcutta
The guerrilla bands of the Mukti Fouj (freedom fighters) have become the armies of the night in East Pakistan. The army is in control of the 78 major towns and most of the larger villages, but—especially in the province of Tippera and Noakhali southeast of Dacca—the guerrillas are getting stronger. Hit-and-run tactics and sabotage threaten the West Pakistani army’s communications; in this way, the people of “Bangla Desh” hope to erode the western wing’s dominion over them. The Mukti Fouj effectively control the narrow corridor between Noakhali and the port of Chittagong ; and bands in Sylhet, Rangpur and Chittagong less strong, have harassed the army there.
Most guerrilla bases are inside East Pakistan, a few groups operate from the Indian side of the border. The bases reflect their determination. “A” camp is a base for former East Pakistan Rifles militiamen, surrounded by lush green jute fields and hidden in a grove in East Pakistan. A young guard snaps to attention at the bamboo gate.
A small Bangla Desh flag hangs from the eaves of one of two long thatched huts in the camp. Inside the huts, about 250 men in sarongs sleep on woven mats laid over the hard packed earth- Near each man lies his weapon, uniform and assorted personal gear. Each hut is 80 feet long by 20 feet wide and sleeps about 60 men.
The camp motor pool also has a sentry, guarding two jeeps, one truck and two farm tractors, all of which have been taken from East Pakistan civil or military forces. Several large tents in the centre of the camp constitute the headquarters area and the officers’ quarters, equipped with old tables and chairs. There is a dispensary, looked after
by the camp’s doctor, Abdul Mannan. “It was only after the events of March 25 that these men revolted,” Dr. Mannan explained. “Only after the Pakistani army attacked the Bengali police and the East Pakistan Rifles headquarters in Dacca and killed large numbers of people did they kill their West Pakistani officers and begin their resistance”.
The camp is clean, and there is good discipline. At six in the morning the men line up and those on patrol that day are briefed—standing to attention as a sergeant reads the names and mission assigned to each man- A pep talk follows, in which the men are exhorted to remember they are fighting for independence and must make great sacrifice.
Patrol leave the camp twice a day, at daybreak and dusk. Most forays last 12 hours, but intermittently there are forays deep into territory controlled by the Pakistan army, and these take four or five days. Each rebel unit consists of about 20 men, but it may be split into smaller groups in the field for some missions. One group will be assigned to watch for Pakistan army patrols which could threaten the camp. The main patrols seek out small army forces or single vehicles on the roads. They may plant mines, but their main tactic is the ambush.
Two former Pakistani artillerymen who have defected Kamuj Jaman, 24, a veteran of the Indo-Pakistan war was in Kashmir, and Sadar Ali, 22, who had three years’ army experience, estimate the men in their camp “have killed more than 200 Pakistanis in the last three months”. This figure is probably inflated since most of the fighting takes place at night when it would be difficult to count the number of dead. A close estimate would be about 50 killed—probably fewer. In Vietnam it is assumed that two men are wounded for every man killed. And it is unlikely these fighters, poorly equipped, could have put a 600-man battalion out of commission.
“We get most of our new arms and ammunition from Pakistan army dead and wounded,” Kamuj Jaman said. “The Mukti Fouj area headquarters periodically sends us supplies too”. There is not a lot of ammunition in the camp, and two men with quartermaster experience keep strict account of all supplies. The ammunition given to each patrol are carefully noted and have to be turned in on completion of the mission, Dr. Mannan commented, “there is not enough ammunition to mount any large attacks, but for guerrilla tactics it is sufficient. The patrols are lightly armed with British sub machine guns, old Enfield rifles and some light machine-guns. Occasionally a group has two-inch mortars, and there are also some anti-tank bazookas that are used against bunkers.
Some men in handcuffs, alleged to be spies for the Pakistan army, were in the camp. Dr. Mannan said local villagers, had reported seeing them leading an army patrol through a guerrilla minefield. The men had confessed to being members of the Moslem League and the Jamat i-Islam Party but denied they were involved in any of the killing and looting done by League people. They insisted they were farmers and had been forced by the army to show them through the mines- According to Mannan : “the men will probably not be shot but will be given a chance to prove their loyalty in battle with the Mukti Fouj. “The captives said they had not been tortured, and they were being fed the same potatoes, curry and rice as the rebels.
During the night one patrol led by Kamuj Jaman made contact with some Pakistani army troops in two bunkers in a small village about half a mile from the camp. The sporadic staccato bursts of machine gun fire could he heard for about an hour. When the patrol returned the following morning, Jaman reported “the villagers told us the Pakistanis were in some bunkers nearby. We tried to sneak up on them, but they heard something and started firing. They knew they had given away their position, so they withdrew. We fired at their noise but don’t know if we hit anyone”.
At present the Mukti Fouj policy is to keep up pressure on the smaller outlying army posts- As the guerrillas become stronger, they will move from the jungles into the small villages and towns and, eventually, into the cities. They count on Islamabad’s financial difficulties and the over¬extended supply lines to bring closer the victory in which they the 75 million people of East Pakistan can endure longer than the 100,000 West Pakistan troops stationed on their soil.
But if recent estimates are correct, 25 million of their compatriots are facing starvation. A major famine is believed by two US doctors to be around the corner—a famine which, because Islamabad refuses to acknowledge the severity of the situation, little has been done to prevent. Soon, they say, it will be too late to avert the crisis. Hoarding of food stock is already commonplace, prices have rocketed—and the army has taken many of the emergency stores.
People asked as Biafra surrendered whether the Nigerian government genuinely wished to make strenuous efforts to save the stubborn Ibos from famine. And the outside world may wonder how blind Islamabad really is. If these people -die, the Mukti Fouj loses a third of its allies. But any such calculation by Islamabad would ignore the probability that every funeral pyre will ignite the hatred of more Bengali. The Bangladesh leaders have said “the time is past for any political solution blood is a river that can never be bridged”.
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