EDITORIAL : DEEP GULF AND HATRED—CAN PAKISTAN EVER BE THE SAME AGAIN ?
THE OTTAWA CITIZEN (Ottawa) September 17, 1971
Today the author discusses various attitudes in Pakistan. Many countries have been split from time to time the United States during its civil war, Nigeria during its agony. But Pakistanis seem even more deeply divided. A young Punjabi chartered accountant declares : “We have only one problem in East Pakistan we don’t have enough bullets to kill all of them India-lovers”. A refugee from India, now a high government official, declares : “It’s true we are ruling them as a colony now—and we will. They deserve it, after the brutalities they committed against innocent men, women and children. You wouldn’t believe it.
They behaved worse than animals”. An East Pakistani says defiantly : “You can kill Mujib if you like. We are all Mujibs. You cannot kill us all, or rule us forever”. One Bengali domestic servant took a shoe and hurled it at the screen when President Yahya Khan was addressing foreign newspaper men on television. Police were summoned and they took him away, as he kept on repeating : “Our army is being trained in India. We will soon be free”. The gulf and hatred between the Pakistanis seems incredible.
The East Pakistani policemen revolted in March. When government appeals to report for duty went unheeded, a police force was shipped form West Pakistan. Labourers were shipped to work in the mills as the Bengalis deserted the cities for the countryside. So were civil servants and bureaucrats from West Pakistan. Now slowly the East Pakistanis are returning to the cities and their jobs. Some policemen are back on duty, but are not issued arms as yet. In the central government, East Pakistanis draw full pay but have been.
transferred to posts where they can do little harm. These precautions seem justified for the present—an East Pakistani cook was caught not long ago mixing poison with food that was to be served in Quetta’s military hospital. Hearing these stories, one wonders whether such a divided nation can ever be united except by force.
There is some optimism in West Pakistan based on the argument that West Pakistan isn’t interested in exploiting East Pakistan or in denying it autonomy and that once the East Pakistanis realized that Islamabad crushed only a foreign- hatched secession movement they’d come around. Others feel the wound is now too deep to be healed. Not all West Pakistanis, however, are behind the government nor are all East Pakistanis for secession. In West Pakistan, many voices were raised before March 25 against any tough action. Admiral S.M- Ahsan, former commander-in-chief of the Pakistan navy, warned President Yahya that armed action in East Pakistan would be immoral and in the long run unworkable. He was removed as governor. Lt.-General Yakub similarly was re¬placed. Air-Marshal Nur Khan, former air force commander became deputy martial law administrator and West Pakistan governor when General Yahya became president. He later resigned. One day after Yahya postponed the assembly session, Nur said : “The president must call the session again in March, otherwise irreparable damage will be done. The presi¬dent is being wrongly advised by a highly placed person. If change of power does not take place, West Pakistan will al¬ways have army rule”. Air-Marshal Asghar Khan, former air force commander, said on March 6 : “Power should immediately be transferred to Mujib. Our hearts are crying with tears of blood for the people in East Pakistan”. On March 12 Major-General Sher Ali Khan, former information minister in Yahya’s cabinet, cabled the president urging him to do nothing which would leave him with “the blame for putting an end to this Islamic republic”. On March 20, five days before the armed action in East Pakistan, the minority parties in West Pakistan held a convention at.Karachi and the 40 members-elect of the National Assembly “endorsed the demand for withdrawal of martial law and transfer of power to the public representatives”.
The Pakistan Students’ Association of America on April 4 called for establishment of democracy throughout Pakistan, withdrawal of army from the cities, release of Mujib and the formation of government by the Awami League. As for the East Pakistanis, both before and after the elections many of them had condemned the rough methods of the Awami League.
On February 1, 1970, a public meeting in Dacca was disrupted after which Pakistan Democratic Party president Nurul Amin, who was later elected to the assembly, said: “I have no words to condemn such activities by the Awami League which, it is clear, has planned the fascist methods to impose their plan on others. This is not the' first occasion the Awami League ha« adopted this policy”. The league ran a highly provocative election campaign. At one public meeting, East Pakistan Awami Leugue General Secretary Tajuddin Ahmed said: “The flesh and blood of the Bengalis had been swallow¬ed up by the exploiters and davits all these years. They must be wiped out from the body politic of the country through the ensuing polls”. After the election, power could have come to Awami League if they had displayed wisdom or even flexibility. But they became adamant and must share the blame for what happened.
Yahya after the election invited all major leaders for talks. Mujib’s refusal not only aroused suspicions in West Pakistan about his motives, but it also gave Mujib’s rival Bhutto a mono¬poly over Yahya’s ears. While this does not justify Yahya’s following Bhutto’s advice, it helps explain why things happen¬ed the way they did. Yahya, by most accounts, blundered in postponing the assembly session. But East Pakistan’s vehement reaction made Yahya reconsider and on March 3 he invited 12 elected members of parliamentary groups in the assembly to meet at Dacca to solve the crisis. Mu jib refused.
On March 6 Yahya announced the session would take place on March 25. Mujib listed four demands, including the immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives at both the central and provincial levels, before he would consider whether to attend.
In despair, Yahya flew to Dacca for talks with Mujib. Even the East Pakistanis working in the President’s house were on strike and Yahya reportedly had an uncomfortable time. But though he conceded the six points of the Awami League, he received fresh demands, including the one changing Pakistan from a federation to a confederation of sovereign states. The atrocities against Urdu-speaking civilians in East Pakistan before March 25 and after turned West Pakistani public opinion against the Bengalis. These were not reported in the Western press, probably because they took place in the interior while the western correspondents were covering the Yahya-Mujib talks in Dacca. The Pakistani government also suppressed the news initially to prevent retaliation against the Bengalis in West Pakistan.
If there was a conspiracy, the Awami League played right into the hands of the conspirators. A little flexibility and statesmanship would have brought them power and the chance to implement their programmer and it would have prevented the butchering of hundreds of thousands of Bengalis and non-Bengalis. Whether Pakistan can ever be the same again now nobody knows.
Today the author discusses various attitudes in Pakistan. Many countries have been split from time to time the United States during its civil war, Nigeria during its agony. But Pakistanis seem even more deeply divided. A young Punjabi chartered accountant declares : “We have only one problem in East Pakistan we don’t have enough bullets to kill all of them India-lovers”. A refugee from India, now a high government official, declares : “It’s true we are ruling them as a colony now—and we will. They deserve it, after the brutalities they committed against innocent men, women and children. You wouldn’t believe it.
They behaved worse than animals”. An East Pakistani says defiantly : “You can kill Mujib if you like. We are all Mujibs. You cannot kill us all, or rule us forever”. One Bengali domestic servant took a shoe and hurled it at the screen when President Yahya Khan was addressing foreign newspaper men on television. Police were summoned and they took him away, as he kept on repeating : “Our army is being trained in India. We will soon be free”. The gulf and hatred between the Pakistanis seems incredible.
The East Pakistani policemen revolted in March. When government appeals to report for duty went unheeded, a police force was shipped form West Pakistan. Labourers were shipped to work in the mills as the Bengalis deserted the cities for the countryside. So were civil servants and bureaucrats from West Pakistan. Now slowly the East Pakistanis are returning to the cities and their jobs. Some policemen are back on duty, but are not issued arms as yet. In the central government, East Pakistanis draw full pay but have been.
transferred to posts where they can do little harm. These precautions seem justified for the present—an East Pakistani cook was caught not long ago mixing poison with food that was to be served in Quetta’s military hospital. Hearing these stories, one wonders whether such a divided nation can ever be united except by force.
There is some optimism in West Pakistan based on the argument that West Pakistan isn’t interested in exploiting East Pakistan or in denying it autonomy and that once the East Pakistanis realized that Islamabad crushed only a foreign- hatched secession movement they’d come around. Others feel the wound is now too deep to be healed. Not all West Pakistanis, however, are behind the government nor are all East Pakistanis for secession. In West Pakistan, many voices were raised before March 25 against any tough action. Admiral S.M- Ahsan, former commander-in-chief of the Pakistan navy, warned President Yahya that armed action in East Pakistan would be immoral and in the long run unworkable. He was removed as governor. Lt.-General Yakub similarly was re¬placed. Air-Marshal Nur Khan, former air force commander became deputy martial law administrator and West Pakistan governor when General Yahya became president. He later resigned. One day after Yahya postponed the assembly session, Nur said : “The president must call the session again in March, otherwise irreparable damage will be done. The presi¬dent is being wrongly advised by a highly placed person. If change of power does not take place, West Pakistan will al¬ways have army rule”. Air-Marshal Asghar Khan, former air force commander, said on March 6 : “Power should immediately be transferred to Mujib. Our hearts are crying with tears of blood for the people in East Pakistan”. On March 12 Major-General Sher Ali Khan, former information minister in Yahya’s cabinet, cabled the president urging him to do nothing which would leave him with “the blame for putting an end to this Islamic republic”. On March 20, five days before the armed action in East Pakistan, the minority parties in West Pakistan held a convention at.Karachi and the 40 members-elect of the National Assembly “endorsed the demand for withdrawal of martial law and transfer of power to the public representatives”.
The Pakistan Students’ Association of America on April 4 called for establishment of democracy throughout Pakistan, withdrawal of army from the cities, release of Mujib and the formation of government by the Awami League. As for the East Pakistanis, both before and after the elections many of them had condemned the rough methods of the Awami League.
On February 1, 1970, a public meeting in Dacca was disrupted after which Pakistan Democratic Party president Nurul Amin, who was later elected to the assembly, said: “I have no words to condemn such activities by the Awami League which, it is clear, has planned the fascist methods to impose their plan on others. This is not the' first occasion the Awami League ha« adopted this policy”. The league ran a highly provocative election campaign. At one public meeting, East Pakistan Awami Leugue General Secretary Tajuddin Ahmed said: “The flesh and blood of the Bengalis had been swallow¬ed up by the exploiters and davits all these years. They must be wiped out from the body politic of the country through the ensuing polls”. After the election, power could have come to Awami League if they had displayed wisdom or even flexibility. But they became adamant and must share the blame for what happened.
Yahya after the election invited all major leaders for talks. Mujib’s refusal not only aroused suspicions in West Pakistan about his motives, but it also gave Mujib’s rival Bhutto a mono¬poly over Yahya’s ears. While this does not justify Yahya’s following Bhutto’s advice, it helps explain why things happen¬ed the way they did. Yahya, by most accounts, blundered in postponing the assembly session. But East Pakistan’s vehement reaction made Yahya reconsider and on March 3 he invited 12 elected members of parliamentary groups in the assembly to meet at Dacca to solve the crisis. Mu jib refused.
On March 6 Yahya announced the session would take place on March 25. Mujib listed four demands, including the immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives at both the central and provincial levels, before he would consider whether to attend.
In despair, Yahya flew to Dacca for talks with Mujib. Even the East Pakistanis working in the President’s house were on strike and Yahya reportedly had an uncomfortable time. But though he conceded the six points of the Awami League, he received fresh demands, including the one changing Pakistan from a federation to a confederation of sovereign states. The atrocities against Urdu-speaking civilians in East Pakistan before March 25 and after turned West Pakistani public opinion against the Bengalis. These were not reported in the Western press, probably because they took place in the interior while the western correspondents were covering the Yahya-Mujib talks in Dacca. The Pakistani government also suppressed the news initially to prevent retaliation against the Bengalis in West Pakistan.
If there was a conspiracy, the Awami League played right into the hands of the conspirators. A little flexibility and statesmanship would have brought them power and the chance to implement their programmer and it would have prevented the butchering of hundreds of thousands of Bengalis and non-Bengalis. Whether Pakistan can ever be the same again now nobody knows.
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