U.S. Govt. Top Secret Report.
Editor’s Note: This report was prepared by Mr. Arthur K. Blood, Consul-General, American Consulate, Dacca with the help of three eminent scholars of Harvard University, U.S.A. They are Mr. Edward A. Mason, Mr. Robert Hoffman and Mr. Stephen A. Marglin. After having compiled the report, Mr. Blood sent it to the U.S. Senate for their necessary guidance.
Later on, it was learnt that Mr. Arthur K. Blood was called back to Washington as a result of his not seeing the fact eye to eye with the U.S. Govt. When we heard of this incident, we were mad to have possession of such secret report. A Bengali employee of the U.S. mission got this report smuggled out of mission which we now place before our readers.
The independence of East Pakistan is inevitable. What * started as a movement for economic autonomy within the framework of a united Pakistan has been irrevocably transferred by the wholesale slaughter of East Pakistani civilians into a movement that sooner or later will produce an independent East Pakistan—“Bangladesh” is a matter of time. A complete discussion of the Pakistan question would include an analysis of cultural, linguistic and social issues, which, along with economic and politics, are at the heart of the present conflict. This paper has a more limited goal: to assess the economic and political bases of disaffection in East Pakistan and to suggest the likely implications for international relations of the breakup of Pakistan.
In brief, the fact of a large and widening gap in the average standard of living between the two regions of the country is incontestable. Even the West Pakistan dominated Government admits that the average East Pakistan must not do with barely two-thirds average income in the West, and he faces higher prices too. The East Pakistanis argue that income disparity is largely the result of a systematic subordination of (he interests of the Eastern region to those of the West; specially, the East Pakistanis charge that allocation of foreign exchange—both that earned by the export of East Pakistani jute and that provided by foreign aid—disproportionately favors West Pakistan; that allocation of domestic investment reinforces the income disparity; and that high tariffs and import quota prices to East Pakistanis in order to provide profits and jobs in West Pakistan.
We believe that in the main the facts support these charges. Pakistan Government policies have, at the very least, excerpted the inequalities that arise from an uneven distribution of natural resources between the two regions, and a disproportionate share of the benefits of economic development have accrued to West Pakistan.
The political programmer of Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League, overwhelmingly endorsed by the people of East Pakistan in the recent elections, sought to correct these disparities by transferring control over economic policy from the Central Government to the provinces. The response of the Yahya Khan’s Government has been to unleash a reign of terror whose full dimensions are only gradually becoming known.
The West Pakistani Army can delay independence, but terrain and logistics coupled with the implacable hostility of the East Pakistanis to what has become foreign domination, are on the side of “Bangladesh”. Apart from the elementary and overwhelmingly humanitarian interest in an end to further bloodshed, American interest lies with a quick rather than a slow realization of independence. Most important, tension in South Asia will be reduced. Bangladesh and India will develop mutually advantageous economic and cultural relations, a move long desired by both sides but frustrated by West Pakistanis who have refused to countenance any normalization of relations in the East as long as the Kashmir issue remains outstanding. The Kashmir issue, too, is likely to subside in importance, not because of any reduction in tension in the West—the Kashmir issue has never aroused much interest in the East but because West Pakistan, without the economic support of the East, will be unable to sustain the level of pressure it has been able to mount until now. In short, Bangladesh will be a truly independent state, ready and able to
Maintain normal relations with its neighbors and the- powerful nations of both block, but a satellite or pawn of no * one.
The independence of Bangladesh will be inimical to American interests only in so far as American aid is used to delay the inevitable. Economic aid to the Pakistan Government should be immediately, suspended. The ‘‘one-time” exception made last year to the embargo of arms sales and military aid (imposed after the Ind-Pakistani war of 1965) should be rescinded. American arms must not be supplied to* a Government that makes war on helpless civilians.
Editor’s Note: This report was prepared by Mr. Arthur K. Blood, Consul-General, American Consulate, Dacca with the help of three eminent scholars of Harvard University, U.S.A. They are Mr. Edward A. Mason, Mr. Robert Hoffman and Mr. Stephen A. Marglin. After having compiled the report, Mr. Blood sent it to the U.S. Senate for their necessary guidance.
Later on, it was learnt that Mr. Arthur K. Blood was called back to Washington as a result of his not seeing the fact eye to eye with the U.S. Govt. When we heard of this incident, we were mad to have possession of such secret report. A Bengali employee of the U.S. mission got this report smuggled out of mission which we now place before our readers.
The independence of East Pakistan is inevitable. What * started as a movement for economic autonomy within the framework of a united Pakistan has been irrevocably transferred by the wholesale slaughter of East Pakistani civilians into a movement that sooner or later will produce an independent East Pakistan—“Bangladesh” is a matter of time. A complete discussion of the Pakistan question would include an analysis of cultural, linguistic and social issues, which, along with economic and politics, are at the heart of the present conflict. This paper has a more limited goal: to assess the economic and political bases of disaffection in East Pakistan and to suggest the likely implications for international relations of the breakup of Pakistan.
In brief, the fact of a large and widening gap in the average standard of living between the two regions of the country is incontestable. Even the West Pakistan dominated Government admits that the average East Pakistan must not do with barely two-thirds average income in the West, and he faces higher prices too. The East Pakistanis argue that income disparity is largely the result of a systematic subordination of (he interests of the Eastern region to those of the West; specially, the East Pakistanis charge that allocation of foreign exchange—both that earned by the export of East Pakistani jute and that provided by foreign aid—disproportionately favors West Pakistan; that allocation of domestic investment reinforces the income disparity; and that high tariffs and import quota prices to East Pakistanis in order to provide profits and jobs in West Pakistan.
We believe that in the main the facts support these charges. Pakistan Government policies have, at the very least, excerpted the inequalities that arise from an uneven distribution of natural resources between the two regions, and a disproportionate share of the benefits of economic development have accrued to West Pakistan.
The political programmer of Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League, overwhelmingly endorsed by the people of East Pakistan in the recent elections, sought to correct these disparities by transferring control over economic policy from the Central Government to the provinces. The response of the Yahya Khan’s Government has been to unleash a reign of terror whose full dimensions are only gradually becoming known.
The West Pakistani Army can delay independence, but terrain and logistics coupled with the implacable hostility of the East Pakistanis to what has become foreign domination, are on the side of “Bangladesh”. Apart from the elementary and overwhelmingly humanitarian interest in an end to further bloodshed, American interest lies with a quick rather than a slow realization of independence. Most important, tension in South Asia will be reduced. Bangladesh and India will develop mutually advantageous economic and cultural relations, a move long desired by both sides but frustrated by West Pakistanis who have refused to countenance any normalization of relations in the East as long as the Kashmir issue remains outstanding. The Kashmir issue, too, is likely to subside in importance, not because of any reduction in tension in the West—the Kashmir issue has never aroused much interest in the East but because West Pakistan, without the economic support of the East, will be unable to sustain the level of pressure it has been able to mount until now. In short, Bangladesh will be a truly independent state, ready and able to
Maintain normal relations with its neighbors and the- powerful nations of both block, but a satellite or pawn of no * one.
The independence of Bangladesh will be inimical to American interests only in so far as American aid is used to delay the inevitable. Economic aid to the Pakistan Government should be immediately, suspended. The ‘‘one-time” exception made last year to the embargo of arms sales and military aid (imposed after the Ind-Pakistani war of 1965) should be rescinded. American arms must not be supplied to* a Government that makes war on helpless civilians.
No comments:
Post a Comment