U.S. Govt. Top Secret Report. BACKGROUND TO THE BREAKUP OF PAKISTAN
The history of economic and political domination of East Pakistan by the West led naturally to increasing demands for provincial autonomy spearheaded by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League. Its 6-point platform for autonomy sought to transfer control over foreign trade, foreign aid allocation and taxation, powers to the provinces so that no province could be dominated through disproportionate control of central government’s powers over resource allocation.
At the polls last December this Awami League platform swept 167 of the 169 seats in the National Constituent Assembly that were allotted to East Pakistan. The Awami League’s 167 seats constituted an absolute majority in a chamber of 313. The political and military powers of West Pakistan tried to pressure Sheikh Mujib into compromising on his 6-point autonomy mandate. In particular Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, leader of the West Pakistani People’s Party which had won 80 odd seats in the elections, demanded that control of trade and aid should remain with the Central Government. When Sheikh Mujib refused to compromise on these instruments of past economic domination, Bhutto announced a boycott of the Constituent Assembly scheduled to meet on March 3. General Yahya Khan used this pretext to postpone the Assembly indefinitely. This arbitrary postponement provoked demonstrations in Dacca and other cities on March 3, which the military decided to control by force. The military authorities conceded 172 deaths in the disturbances (the Dacca correspondent of the London Observer put the figure nearer 2000). Despite this bloody provocation the Awami League refrained from declaring independence. Instead they launched a campaign of civil disobedience to demand a return of troops to barracks and an inquiry into the firings. The campaign of non-cooperation effectively transferred civilian authority to Sheikh Mujib, but even in the massive rally of March 7 Sheikh Mujib still spoke of a united Pakistan with autonomy for each province. His preparedness for negotiation and commitment to the unity of Pakistan was demonstrated by his continuation of talks for the next two weeks despite the well-advertised influx of West Pakistani troops. Indeed, in retrospect it would appear that the West Pakistani officials were never negotiating in good faith; negotiations were a way to forestall an open licit until sufficient numbers of West Pakistani troops could be brought on the scene to unleash a terror whose full dimen- Blomi nre only now becoming known. The Awami League’s commitment to a peaceful political settlement was convincingly demonstrated by the complete lack of preparation of the civilian population to the onslaught of military arms which was unleashed on them on the night of Thursday March 25.
At the polls last December this Awami League platform swept 167 of the 169 seats in the National Constituent Assembly that were allotted to East Pakistan. The Awami League’s 167 seats constituted an absolute majority in a chamber of 313. The political and military powers of West Pakistan tried to pressure Sheikh Mujib into compromising on his 6-point autonomy mandate. In particular Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, leader of the West Pakistani People’s Party which had won 80 odd seats in the elections, demanded that control of trade and aid should remain with the Central Government. When Sheikh Mujib refused to compromise on these instruments of past economic domination, Bhutto announced a boycott of the Constituent Assembly scheduled to meet on March 3. General Yahya Khan used this pretext to postpone the Assembly indefinitely. This arbitrary postponement provoked demonstrations in Dacca and other cities on March 3, which the military decided to control by force. The military authorities conceded 172 deaths in the disturbances (the Dacca correspondent of the London Observer put the figure nearer 2000). Despite this bloody provocation the Awami League refrained from declaring independence. Instead they launched a campaign of civil disobedience to demand a return of troops to barracks and an inquiry into the firings. The campaign of non-cooperation effectively transferred civilian authority to Sheikh Mujib, but even in the massive rally of March 7 Sheikh Mujib still spoke of a united Pakistan with autonomy for each province. His preparedness for negotiation and commitment to the unity of Pakistan was demonstrated by his continuation of talks for the next two weeks despite the well-advertised influx of West Pakistani troops. Indeed, in retrospect it would appear that the West Pakistani officials were never negotiating in good faith; negotiations were a way to forestall an open licit until sufficient numbers of West Pakistani troops could be brought on the scene to unleash a terror whose full dimen- Blomi nre only now becoming known. The Awami League’s commitment to a peaceful political settlement was convincingly demonstrated by the complete lack of preparation of the civilian population to the onslaught of military arms which was unleashed on them on the night of Thursday March 25.
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